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Throughout Husserl’s entire work, phenomenology turns out to 
have two distinct moments: static phenomenology and genetic 
phenomenology. If static phenomenology is concerned with the 
constitution of meaning into the realm of immanent 
consciousness regardless of the temporal dimension of 
consciousness, genetic phenomenology gives an account of the 
primal institution of meaning in the ego’s experience of the 
world. As far as the latter is concerned, Husserl distinguishes 
between two types of syntheses, the active and the passive 
genesis. While the active geneses refer to the original egoic 
production of meanings through active syntheses, passive 
geneses denote a synthetic formation of meanings which, 
although not entirely independent from the ego’s participation, 
are not the results of the ego’s activity. In considering this 
distinction, Husserl tends to have a hierarchical understanding 
of it, subordinating passivity to activity. Victor Biceaga’s book 
The Concept of Passivity in Husserl’s Phenomenology comes to 
challenge precisely this understanding of the distinction, 
arguing that despite Husserl’s bias for it, he refuses a clear 
separation of activity and passivity, thus questioning the BOOK REVIEWS 
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advance of the former over the later. To support his 
argumentation, Biceaga will uncover three of Husserl’s 
strategies in weakening the hierarchical advance of activity 
over passivity. The first one takes into consideration the level of 
originary passivity, trying to soften the opposition activity/ 
passivity by turning it into a matter of degree rather than a 
matter of kind. The second strategy brings to the fore the 
inseparability and mutual dependency of activity and passivity 
at the level of secondary passivity. The last strategy consists in 
disengaging passivity from its opposition to activity by 
revealing its role in the experience of the alien 
(Fremderfahrung) (p. xxi). The pinpoint of all these strategies is 
not to reverse the hierarchy, but rather to show that Husserl 
supports a broader view of passivity than most of his 
interpreters tend to acknowledge. 
The first chapter of the book is concerned with time–
consciousness. Since this is the fundamental phenomenon of 
passive geneses, this means not only that it grounds all the 
other passive synthesis – those which belong to originary as 
well as to secondary passivity – but all the three strategies 
mentioned above will be found implicitly or explicitly at this 
level. 
After distinguishing between temporal and associative 
synthesis, Biceaga turns to the way Husserl describes the three 
levels of time-consciousness. Since the first level – transcendent 
time – belongs to the natural attitude, it concerns the 
phenomenologist only as reduced. This brings into view the 
second (subjective time) and the third (absolute flow) levels. For 
a better understanding of the distinction between the last two 
levels of time-consciousness, Husserl not only calls the absolute 
flow pre-phenomenal and pre-immanent, but he also forges the 
distinction constituting/constituted to point that the absolute 
flow is constituted and constituting at the same time. At this 
point, Biceaga states that the bending of this conceptual couple 
opens the way for rethinking other conceptual couples including 
activity/passivity. 
Returning to the self-manifestation of the flow, the 
author notes that its peculiarity consists in that it blocks, from 
the beginning, any attempt to present it reflectively. This case META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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is proved by Husserl’s employment of transversal and 
longitudinal intentionalities: whereas the first synthesizes the 
content of the actual now with the contents of the retention and 
protention, the second synthesizes the actual intending with its 
corresponding retainings and protendings, that is, the flow 
itself. Nevertheless, Biceaga points that since the longitudinal 
and transverse intentionalities are not separated but 
intertwined, they come to name the same process from a 
different perspective. This means that the self-affection of the 
absolute flow is intertwined with “some kind of preoccupation 
or affection from objects other than itself” (p. 9). This fact shows 
that there is an intrusion of the alien into the primordial 
sphere, either through affection, as the hyletic core of every 
living present, or as openness to the experience of the alter-ego 
or cultural world. The end of the chapter brings to the fore the 
affinity between passivity and rhythm which links the a priori 
form of the flow with the associations of concrete contents of 
consciousness. 
The next chapter follows the lead of the first and gives 
an account of the second phenomena from the sphere of 
originary passivity, that is, primordial associations. As the 
author notes, Husserl defines primordial associations as 
“associations between passively pre-given sense contents 
belonging to the sphere of the present” (p. 19). Husserl is 
concerned with this type of associations as far as they are 
establishing the laws and regularities of passive syntheses 
which found judicative acts. Since primordial associations never 
appear in ordinary experience, their meaning is unveiled only 
through reduction. This brings to the fore the fact that the ego 
never perceives pure sense data, but rather meaningful unities, 
that is, affective tendencies belonging to the present impression 
organized by original associations. Nevertheless, Biceaga points 
out the fact that the pre-givenness of meaningful unities does 
not necessarily imply that the ego is simply acted upon on the 
level of passive receptivity; rather, it could mean that in the 
formation of sensorial unities, passive and active components 
conjoin each other. To sustain this last point the author will 
engage in a large discussion about associations of similarity and 
contrast and the relation between affection and prominence. BOOK REVIEWS 
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The major outcome of this inquiry is that it brings to the fore 
two interpretations of the passivity of primordial associations. 
According to the first, primordial associations are independent 
from categorical acts and reproductive associations and 
therefore independent from the ego’s participation. On the 
second interpretation, primordial associations govern the 
propagation of affective awakenings, therefore determining the 
passive response of the ego to the affective pull of what is alien 
to it. But this response of the ego is not purely passive, since it 
involves the constant effort of opening its horizon of receptivity. 
The third chapter is a foray into the sphere of secondary 
passivity. If distinct profiles of the same object are to form 
objective evidence, then an account of memory as sedimentation 
and recollection must be brought up. The author claims that, 
instead of joining the distinction sedimentation/recollection 
with the distinction passive/active, Husserl prefers to describe 
memory as a compound of passive and active components. 
Biceaga starts by analyzing the two Husserlian accounts 
of memory, the image memory account and the account of 
memory as reproductive presentation. Due to the lack of 
differentiation between perception and recollection and to the 
passivism sedimentation, the first account proves unsatisfying. 
The second account defines remembering as a quasi-perception 
in which the object itself is presentified, thus describing 
remembering as positing acts. On this account of memory, the 
problem of the present awareness of the past is solved by the 
double function of retention. Since reproductive acts must reap 
the benefits of primordial givenness, it comes to retention to 
transfer evidence to reproductive consciousness thus spilling 
presence into absence, and also gradually erase the affective 
force of the present and infiltrate absence into presence. Due to 
the double role of retentions, the sphere of present is not closed 
upon itself but opened toward absence. This points to the idea 
of a double track consciousness. Roughly, it states that in an act 
of remembering, I remember my experience of a past X, a fact 
which brings a form of alterity to the primordial sphere. 
Ultimately this means that every act of remembering involves 
forgetting and vice versa. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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Since memory has a similar structuring/organizational 
function as the perceptual field, the double role of retention also 
brings light on how associations work at the level of memory, 
thus describing them as regularities which prescribe typical 
forms of connection. The same double role of retention recasts 
the problem of forgetting in more positive terms. 
The forth chapter deals with the problem of the 
intersubjective level of sedimentation as another major topic of 
secondary passivity. First the author focuses on the theme of 
habitualities and their hybrid nature. Although their 
acquirement requires constant involvement and effort on the 
part of the ego, they end up in erasing this involvement 
characteristic to the ego’s engagement with its environment. 
The hybrid nature of habitualities signals a combination of 
active and passive components. Translated into epistemological 
terms, habitualities ensure the constant advance of judicative 
acts but also obscure, through continuous storage of multiple 
layers of meaning, the task of scientific and ethical renewal. 
For Husserl, this last operation ends up in cultural crises. To 
elude this negative role of passivity, Biceaga points out that, 
although traditions encourage the “taking-for-granted-ness”, 
they also establish a rigorous pattern of meanings that can be 
reiterated by future generations. This reiteration is not a mere 
repetition, but rather a re-construction of meaning. 
As far as the problem of habitualities and sedimentation 
is concerned, Biceaga shifts his focus to the case of language 
and documentation. Documentation is a kind of sedimentation 
since writing records constituted meanings by covering their 
sense giving acts. An important factor in the covering up of 
sense giving acts is the “seduction of language”, which 
ultimately encourages the free play of associative construction 
(p. 82). To rule out this constant tendency of the natural 
language, Husserl proposes a pure logical grammar as a science 
of a priori combination of meaning. This would make the case 
for activity overcoming passivity if it wasn’t for the unsatisfying 
account of translation provided by Husserl’s pure logical 
grammar. Roughly it states that translation is a reiteration of 
the original meaning. But, Biceaga notes, this migration of 
meaning from the foreign to the domestic language (Sprachleib) BOOK REVIEWS 
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is made possible by the fact that the later already harbours in 
itself a space for foreignness. Thus translation appears as a 
balance between a passive reception of the foreign and an active 
incorporation of it, revealing a model for resolving cultural 
crisis. 
The last chapter focuses on showing that ultimately, the 
role of passivity is to mediate the relation between ownness and 
otherness. The author will pinpoint this with reference to the 
phenomena of the body, alter-ego and cultural alien world. 
Biceaga starts by emphasizing the two meanings of body 
passivity: as being affected by the outside world, and as self–
affection. This last sense brings into view the distinction 
between the physical body (Körper) and lived body (Leib). This 
self differentiation that accompanies all intuitive experience 
brings to the fore the bodily self-awareness that not only 
accompanies perception but also makes it possible. The 
passivity of bodily self–awareness has two meanings: it is 
marginal and pre-reflectively involved in any perception and to 
gain it interaction with the external surroundings is necessary. 
This reveals that the meaning of body passivity does not rest 
with receptivity, but rather with the space it offers for the 
confrontation of ownness and otherness. But there is more to 
the distinction between lived body and physical body. In order 
to objectify itself, the lived body must suffer a transfer of sense 
from the physical body. As the case of double sensation shows, 
the bodily reflection splits the body into two co-present poles 
that leave the body as imperfectly constituted. Again, this 
shows the body as the place where the proper and the alien 
pass into one another. This meaning of passivity as mediator 
between ownness and otherness is even more prominent when 
it comes to the constitution of the alter ego. The author notes 
that the mirroring of the alter ego into my primordial sphere 
denotes an unwanted hierarchical relation. To rule out this 
understanding, Biceaga will highlight two things. Firstly, my 
body points to the alter ego’s body through the passive 
synthesis of pairing. Since this synthesis is not between 
asymmetrical terms, the transfer of sense is inconceivable. 
Therefore Biceaga’s second point is made by analogical 
apperception. This form of synthesis not only transfers the META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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meaning of my lived body to the other’s physical body, but also 
the meaning of the other’s physical body to my lived body. This 
process of alienation of the ego brings together passive and 
active elements; passive elements, since the alter ego 
interpellates and alienates the ego; active elements since it is 
the ego that must carry through the act of alienation. 
At the end of the chapter, Bicega focuses on the 
interaction between different cultural worlds. In order to avoid 
Husserl’s idea of cultural totalization, Biceaga forges the 
concept of accessible inaccessibility. He states that in cultural 
encounters not only the foreign culture is pinpointed as 
accessible inaccessibility, but also the home culture. Thus, the 
experience of the encounter shows not only that both cultures 
are modified, but pinpoints to the partly active, partly passive 
becoming alien of the home culture.  
As a final consideration, Victor Biceaga’s book is not 
simply an inventory of different meanings of passivity, but a 
carefully guided phenomenological analyses that leads to the 
last chapter, one that circumscribes passivity as a mediator 
between ownness and otherness. 
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